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1I. Introduction 
The manner in which international law is applied by the domestic courts of the 
United States has been an issue without any definitive boundaries since 1789.  It is 
unclear as to the type and extent of international law that could be brought as a cause of 
action inside the United States for events that occurred outside its borders.  The landmark 
case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,1 decided by the Supreme Court in 2004, has changed 
the landscape in this area.  This decision will alter the field of domestic enforcement of 
international law by making it exceedingly difficult for an non-citizen to sue under the 
Alien’s Tort Claims Act2 (“ATCA”) for recovery against a tortious act committed outside 
the U.S. by a party that comes under the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.3 Sosa also 
eliminates any liability of the U.S. government in U.S. courts under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act4 (“FTCA”) for any alleged tortious acts that occur in a foreign country.5
These new limitations may lead to an accession of abuses by the U.S. 
government, U.S. entities, and other foreign powers due to the lack culpability for torts 
they may commit.  On the other hand, Sosa helps the judiciary in maintaining its 
independence from foreign policy in order to allow the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the federal government to exercise their constitutionally granted powers to 
dictate U.S. foreign policy abroad.  While it attempted to balance conflicting interests, the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Sosa is vague, and has thus been subject to divergent 
application by different federal judges since 2004, resulting in similar cases being 
decided quite differently.  In order to stem the problems of conflicting case results and an 
 
1 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004). 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). 
4 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. 
5 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739. 
2accession of unchecked abuses, Congress should use its legislative powers to create a 
more definitive policy that clarifies the application of international law in U.S. courts and 
liability of the U.S. government for extraterritorial acts in order to create uniformity in 
these areas, hold parties liable for extreme violations of human rights, and avoid 
divergent and conflicting judicial decisions. 
 Part II of this note discusses the ATCA and FTCA past and present.  A history of 
both statutes and the specific provisions that relate to changes made by the Supreme 
Court in Sosa are discussed.  The former broad standard for judicial creation of new 
causes of action under the ATCA, and how that has been limited under the Sosa decision 
is examined.  The article will then look at the discretion that the Supreme Court left up to 
lower courts in allowing causes of action under the ATCA, and how they intended for 
that discretion to be applied. 
 Next, the note will give a history to the FTCA, its foreign country exception, and 
the creation of the headquarters doctrine as a part of the common law.  The discussion 
will then turn to the elimination of the headquarters doctrine by the Supreme Court in 
Sosa, and the effect that had on eliminating suits against the U.S. for torts committed on 
foreign soil. 
 Part III will focus on problems that have arisen under the new standards 
subsequent to the Sosa decision.  The dangers of the U.S. invoking sovereign immunity 
and eliminating all suits against the U.S. for acts that occur on foreign soil are examined.  
The discussion then moves to some of the problems that have arisen under the ATCA, 
which includes conflicting judicial decisions and the ability to aid crimes against 
humanity in the pursuit of profit while remaining immune from liability. 
3Finally, the note concludes that the Supreme Court attempted, but failed to 
sufficiently clarify ambiguities and nuances of the ATCA and FTCA and create clear 
standards for judges to follow.  These failures have led to conflicting court decisions and 
allowed for other harms to occur.  As a result of these problems, there is a need for 
Congress to step in and create clear, exact, and fair standards under these statutes. 
II. The Sosa Case and the New Standards 
When the Supreme Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain6 in 2004, they 
modified significantly the scope of the ATCA and FTCA, and severely limited the power 
of U.S. courts to hear cases based on events that occurred on foreign soil.  The ATCA, an 
ambiguous statute that has drawn constant debate and speculation over the last two 
hundred plus years as to Congress’s true intent when passing the bill, had been 
interpreted broadly since the 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.7 Due to the 
creation of the headquarters doctrine, the FTCA also had a broad scope in allowing cases 
resulting from acts occurring on foreign soil to be heard against the U.S. in U.S. courts.  
However the decision of the Supreme Court in Sosa narrowed the spectrum of cases 
allowed into federal court under both statutes. 
A. The Alien’s Tort Claims Act 
1. Background and History 
 The Alien’s Tort Claims Act, also known as the Alien’s Tort Statute, which was 
originally passed as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,8 reads, “[t]he district courts shall 
 
6 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004). 
7 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980). 
8 The original statute, as passed in 1789, read, “The district courts shall also have cognizance, concurrent 
with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien 
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” but has been 
amended several times until it has reached its current form. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 
79. Id. at 2755.   
4have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”9 This short and vague 
statute gives no indication as to what Congress intended when they passed this law over 
two hundred years ago.  It does not specify whether the grant of jurisdiction to federal 
courts is personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or the extent of that grant for courts to 
hear cases.  As a result of the vagueness of the statute, there has been an ongoing legal 
debate ever since its passage by the first Congress. 
Some judges, such as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Kaufman, 
have decided that the ATCA grants not only jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases 
based on the law of nations, but also gives the courts the power to create new causes of 
action based on customary norms of international law.10 This conception of the ATCA 
allows courts to use their discretion as to whether an international norm is worthy of 
being adopted by U.S. courts so that individuals could create an action based on events 
that occurred outside U.S. borders.11 This interpretation of the ATCA comes from the 
idea that Congress intended the statute to evolve through the years and adopt new norms 
in new times when they passed it in 1789.12 
However, other jurists, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia, concurring in 
the Sosa opinion, believe that the ATCA is solely a jurisdictional statute, granting the 
courts the ability to hear such cases, but giving no authority to create new causes of 
action under common law.13 Under this conception, in order for an individual to sue 
 
9 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
10 Courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the 
nations of the world today. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881, 887 (1980). 
11 Id. at 880. 
12 Id. at 886. 
13 Justice Scalia believes that to allow the ATCA to create new causes of action, “neglects the ‘lesson of 
Erie,’ that ‘grants of jurisdiction alone’ (which the Court has acknowledged the ATCA to be) ‘are not 
5under international law through the ATCA, Congress must have either intended a cause 
of action to be created with the law at its passage in 1789, or Congress must have later 
passed a statute expressly creating a cause of action for such a matter.14 Without such an 
express authorization from Congress, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear a case 
based on international law, but no authority to create a new cause of action.15 
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 is an example of one such statute that 
has been passed by Congress which explicitly creates a cause of action under the ATCA 
based on the law of nations.16 The statute’s stated purpose is “[t]o carry out obligations 
of the United States under the United Nations Charter and other international agreements 
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of 
damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.”17 However, 
while this creates a cause of action against the actual perpetrators of torture or 
extrajudicial killing in federal court, it does nothing to create a means of remedy to any 
accessories to such acts, by means of financing or other types of support.18 If, for 
example, a U.S. company were to financially back a regime that participated in torture 
and murder, the victim would have no means for recovery in the country of the violation, 
and would also have no statutory means for bringing such a party into a U.S. court.19 
And if there is no manner in which a company can be held liable for its wrongful aid to 
 
themselves grants of law-making authority.’ ” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2772 (concurring) (quoting 42 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 513 at 541). 
14 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2776. 
15 Id.
16 102 P.L. 256 (1992). 
17 An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation -- 
 (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or 
 (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the 
individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 
Id. 
18 Owen C. Pell, Tort Claims Under International Law, 231 New York Law Journal 4 (col. 4), August 8, 
2004, at 4. 
19 Id.
6atrocities, it is likely that many companies will increasingly aid atrocities abroad in the 
pursuit of greater profits. 
2. The Filartiga Decision 
The landmark case that initially established a standard for the creation of new 
causes of action under the ATCA was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.20 Dr. Joel Filartiga was a 
citizen of the Republic of Paraguay and a longstanding opponent of the government in 
power there.21 He brought an action against the Inspector General of Police, Americo 
Norberto Pena-Irala for the kidnapping, torture, 22 and wrongful death of his son in 
Paraguay in 1976.23 In 1978, Pena entered the United States on a visitor’s visa,24 which 
gave Dolly Filartiga, daughter of Joel, the opportunity to serve him with a civil complaint 
for, among other charges, violations of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and various other norms of 
customary international law, none of which were statutory causes of action under U.S. 
domestic law.25 
Filartiga claimed that the alleged conduct violated the “law of nations26 and 
thereby used 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the basis for federal jurisdiction of these actions.”27 
The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.  However the Second Circuit 
reversed and stated: 
 
20 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980). 
21 Id. at 877. 
22 Today this would be actionable under the aforementioned Torture Victim Protection Act.  However the 
events in this case occurred in 1976, fifteen years before the creation of the statute. 
23 Filartiga at 877. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 879. 
26 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
27 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
7In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous international 
agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official 
policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in 
practice), we find that an act of torture committed by a state official 
against one held in detention violates established norms of the 
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.28 
Since torture under color of official authority violates the law of nations, “whenever an 
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 
provides federal jurisdiction,” and can therefore be sued in U.S. courts regardless of 
where the act took place.29 In so holding, the court established the precedent that if an act 
violates the accepted and established norms of customary international law, then it will be 
actionable in U.S. courts under the ATCA. 
 The Second Circuit reasoned that the law of nations has been a part of federal 
common law ever since the Constitution was signed, and that same constitutional basis is 
also the foundation for the ATCA.30 “Upon ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen 
former colonies were fused into a single nation, one which, in its relations with foreign 
states, is bound both to observe and construe the accepted norms of international law, 
formerly known as the law of nations.”31 In fact, Article I of the United States 
Constitution states that one of Congress’s powers is, “[t]o define and punish piracies and 
felonies committed on the high Seas, and offences against the law of nations.”32 
The Second Circuit determined that the appropriate sources for determining 
international law, which had previously been enumerated by the Supreme Court,33 can 
include works of jurists, the general practices of nations, or judicial decisions recognizing 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 878, 880. 
30 Id. at 885. 
31 Id. at 877. 
32 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 
33 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. 
Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
8such law, none of which are any type of binding law, but nonetheless give insight into 
what scholars believe the state of international law is in the present.34 “During the 
eighteenth century, it was taken for granted on both sides of the Atlantic that the law of 
nations forms a part of the common law.”35 This, the court believed, was evidence that 
the ATCA should evolve to include whatever the current law of nations may become, not 
to be stuck in the common law of 1789. 
 The Second Circuit held that allowing these causes of action under the ATCA 
does not create new law, but instead follows the existing common law.  The Constitution 
itself states that one of Congress’s jobs was to punish offences against the law of 
nations.36 The Second Circuit found this provision to create a common law that evolves 
to adopt whatever the current law of nations may be.  Chief Justice John Marshall once 
said, “in the absence of a congressional enactment, United States courts are ‘bound by the 
law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land.’”37 For this reason, the Second 
Circuit found that the ATCA could hold causes of action under the law of nations that 
were not a part of the common law in 1789 because they “believe it is sufficient here to 
construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as 
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by 
international law.”38 
34 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
35 Id. 
36 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 
37 Id. at 887 (quoting The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815)). 
38 Id. 
93. The Sosa Decision and its Limitation on the ATCA 
 The Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga remained unchallenged until the Sosa39 
case reached the Supreme Court in 2004.  In Sosa, the Supreme Court greatly restricted 
the types of cases that could be brought into federal court under the ATCA by labeling it 
as primarily a jurisdictional statute that was not often meant to create new causes of 
action under common law based upon evolving international norms.40 
The respondent in Sosa, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was 
believed to have participated in the torture and murder of a captured agent from the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) while in Mexico.41 A federal grand jury indicted 
Alvarez, still in Mexico, for the torture and murder of the agent, and a federal court 
issued a warrant for his arrest.42 When the conclusion was reached that extradition 
negotiations with the Mexican government would be unsuccessful, the DEA approved 
and executed a plan for a group of Mexicans, which included the petitioner Jose 
Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez, hold him overnight, and bring him to the U.S. for 
arrest by federal officials.43 After his subsequent acquittal in federal court, Alvarez 
returned to Mexico where he filed an action under the ATCA against several Mexican 
and American citizens, Sosa among them.44 
As opposed to the wide latitude granted by the Second Circuit to the ATCA in 
Filartiga, in Sosa the Supreme Court decided that the ATCA was passed mostly as a 
jurisdictional statute that was meant to create a sector for common law causes of action 
 
39 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004). 
40 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004). 
41 Id. at 2746. 
42 Id. 
43 Id, 
44 Id. 
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for aliens based upon customary international law.  The Court contends that when the 
ATCA was passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress “gave the district courts 
cognizance of certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not 
power to mold substantive law.”45 That the ATCA was intended to be a statute granting 
jurisdiction, not a grant to the judiciary to create new law, the Court asserts is evidenced 
by its placement in § 9 of the Judiciary Act.46 The Judiciary Act is a statute which is 
strictly concerned with jurisdiction, not substantive law.47 Had Congress intended to give 
authority to judges to create additional causes of action under the ATCA, they would 
have stated so expressly or at least attached this statute to a law that dealt with creation of 
substantive law.48 
However, while the Court was trying to impose strict limitations on the reach of 
the ATCA, the Court also realized that if this theory, that the statute was of a purely 
jurisdictional grant, was to be taken to its logical conclusion, then the ATCA would be 
rendered a toothless statute.49 Congress did not expressly authorize any cause of action 
when the law was passed, and thus would be granting jurisdiction for the courts to hear 
absolutely nothing.50 Taking these and other historical records into consideration the 
court reasoned that: 
Although the ATCA is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of 
action, the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the 
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law. 
The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for 
 
45 Id. at 2755.  See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 447, 451 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). (A. Hamilton) (using 
“jurisdiction” interchangeably with “cognizance”). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761. 
50 Id. 
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the modest number of international law violations with a potential for 
personal liability at the time.51 
As a result, the Court held that any torts that were in violation of the law of nations at the 
time of the passage of the bill in 1789 are claims that could be entertained under the 
ATCA because they were recognized within the common law of the time.52 Therefore, it 
could be presumed that Congress intended them to be actionable when passing this 
statute.53 
The Court in Sosa found that it was likely that three main offenses against “the 
law of nations” that were on the minds of the men who drafted the ATCA, and hence 
actionable under the common law: (i) violations of safe conducts54, (ii) infringement of 
the rights of an ambassador, and (iii) piracy.55 These were the three main norms of 
international law, adopted from England, that were a part of common law in 1789, and 
hence were implicitly intended to be actionable under § 1350.56 
In order to create substantive law in addition to the three enumerated offenses, the 
Court thinks it imperative to look for legislative guidance.57 The Supreme Court stated 
that “a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment 
in the great majority of cases”.58 And since there has been practically no Congressional 
guidance on this subject matter since the original passage back in 1789, the Court 
believes it to be imprudent for the judiciary to legislate new actions without any express 
 
51 Id. 
52 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
53 Id. 
54 Violation of safe conducts relates to hostile acts that could result in path that would take nations to war.  
Id. at 2756-57 
55 Id. at 2756. 
56 The ATCA and the three enumerated norms primarily worked to protect the sovereignty of nations in a 
time when wars of conquest were rampant, not to work as private actions for aliens.  For example, an 
assault on an ambassador could cause a chain of events that lead to war.  Id. 
57 Id. at 2762-2763. 
58 Id.
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or implicit authority from Congress.59 “We are reluctant to infer intent to provide a 
private cause of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.”60 Therefore, the 
court urges extreme judicial caution when allowing an action to be heard under the 
ATCA. 
4. The Possibility for Actions Based on Customary Norms of International Law 
 While the Sosa Court held that the ATCA was not intended to give the judiciary 
wide discretion to create new law, there is some evidence to show that it was intended to 
allow for some creation of new law based on international norms.  There were several 
cases in the 1790s in which the decisions mentioned in dictum that there would be no 
need for further legislation to be passed to give the district courts jurisdiction to hear a 
particular statute.61 This is an indication the ATCA was not meant to be merely a 
jurisdictional statute, and be put on the shelf until Congress passed more legislation 
expressly certifying certain cases actionable under the ATCA, but rather was intended to 
be a statute granting courts the power to hear some actions under common law. 
 The Court in Sosa did take this idea into account, and has left the door open for 
lawsuits based on modern customary international law.  While the Court will continue to 
allow common law actions to be heard under the ATCA, the types of cases that can be 
heard are severely limited.  Under the Filartiga decision, the federal common law 
includes the law of nations as they appear today according to jurists and scholars, and 
 
59 Id. at 2763. 
60 Id. 
61 See, Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9,895) (D.Pa. 1793); 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57. In his opinion 
on one 1795 case regarding the liability of Americans in U.S. courts who had taken part in the French 
plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone, Attorney General William Bradford stated, "But there 
can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a 
remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts 
in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United 
States . . . ."  124 S. Ct. at 2759 Quoting 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57, 59 
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those norms can create new causes of action under the ATCA.  The Supreme Court has 
now rigorously limited that doctrine: 
There are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a 
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this 
kind. Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable 
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.62 
Common law causes of actions may still be created.  However the Sosa Court defines 
these causes of actions to arise solely out of violations of norms that are accepted by the 
entire civilized world as the law of nations; in addition, they must be of a specific variety, 
such as the three original norms from 1789.63 The U.S. has recognized and respected the 
law of nations since its creation.  Failure to continue to do so would reverse over two 
hundred years of history and precedent.  While Congress could take action to extend or 
limit judicial authority, their failure to do so since 1789 does not prevent the courts from 
allowing some common law to be created regarding the law of nations.64 
5. The Emerging Standard from Sosa  
Once the Court decided that the judiciary has the discretionary power to create 
causes of action under § 135065 under very limited circumstances, the Court set out to 
create a rigid standard to accompany its contention that there is still room for a “narrow 
 
62 Sosa,124 S. Ct. at 2761-2762. 
63 Id. at 2761-62.  These three norms are (i) violations of safe conducts, (ii) infringements of the rights of an 
ambassador, and (iii) piracy.  Id. at 2756. 
64 “It is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate 
circumstances.”  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.  “[T]he court is bound by the law of nations which is a part 
of the law of the land” The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423 (1815). 
65 While Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment, 
they disagreed with the rest of the court concerning the idea that the ATCA gave any amount of 
discretionary power to the judiciary to create causes of action based on international law.  In his 
concurring opinion Justice Scalia stated, “In Benthamite terms, creating a federal command (federal 
common law) out of ‘international norms,’ and then constructing a cause of action to enforce that 
command through the purely jurisdictional grant of the ATCA, is nonsense upon stilts.” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2772.  Despite this divergence of opinion, the judgment in Sosa remained a unanimous decision. 
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class of international norms today.”66 One of the Court’s primary concerns when creating 
a standard regarding the merits of a claim was its desire for judicial caution in this matter.  
The Court listed two main considerations for a judge to take into account when deciding 
whether to allow an action under § 1350, (1) definitively accepted norms of international 
law and (2) political considerations and the separation of powers.67 
a. Definitively Accepted Norms of International Law 
The first consideration that a court must take into account is that, in order for the 
action to be allowed, it must be based on a definitive norm that is accepted throughout the 
civilized world,68 not one that is only accepted in some nations.69 “Federal courts should 
not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international 
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”70 To do so would potentially 
allow cases into federal court that use customary international law that is not accepted in 
some civilized nations as the basis for the cause of action.71 This could lead to U.S. 
courts virtually applying norms to civilized nations that do not accept such norms, and 
mandating that they do.  Therefore only norms that are accepted by all civilized nations, 
such as torture, rape, and murder can be allowed as a cause of action under the ATCA.72 
This limitation is necessary because hearing cases based on international laws that 
are not universally accepted in the civilized world could hold sovereign foreign 
 
66 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2772. 
67 Id. at 2765-66 
68 However, at no point in the Sosa  opinion did the Supreme Court define the term “civilized world,” 
which leaves the opening for a great ambiguity in what nations are civilized and what laws are accepted 
throughout.  Perhaps Congress could create legislation exactly giving definitive guidelines as to what 
laws or types of laws should be followed. 
69 Id. at 2765. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 2765-66. 
72 Id.
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governments liable to their own citizens under the American justice system.  This could 
not only create enormous friction between the United States and other nations, but will 
also have the effect of forcing our accepted norms and laws onto other nations that may 
possess different views and cultures.  If norms are accepted in some civilized nations, but 
not others, then the United States has no right, and the courts no mandate, to enforce 
international customs that are not universally accepted. 
To implement U.S. norms that are not accepted around the world would boast an 
arrogance that would communicate to the world that the United States courts believe 
themselves superior to the courts of other nations and have controlling effect in all 
nations around the world.  This would be a dangerous path to take, especially in the 
political climate of the world today.  The War in Iraq (2003) has caused much friction 
between the U.S. government and disagreeing governments and private citizens around 
the world.  Many view the U.S.’s invasion of a sovereign nation with no legitimate 
mandate from the United Nations or the international community generally as violation of 
international law.73 Other scandals, such as the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal, have 
darkened the image of the United States around the world.74 At such a time, it would be 
unadvisable and improper for a U.S. court to potentially litigate domestic affairs of a 
sovereign nation in a U.S. court under the rationale that the government may have 
 
73 In fact the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan himself called the War in Iraq “illegal” under 
international law and claimed that it was not in “conformity” with the U.N. Charter.  Patrick E. Tyler, 
U.N. Chief Ignites Firestorm by Calling Iraq War Illegal, N.Y. Times, September 17, 2004, at A1. 
74 “ ‘The United States already had very little credibility in the Middle East, and it is now approaching 
zero,’ said Abdelmonem, the director of Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo . . . 
‘There was talk about fighting terrorism, and they brought terrorism with them. Finally, the issue of 
democracy and respect for human rights: Saddam was a butcher who tortured people; now the United 
States is torturing people.’ ”  Neil MacFarquhar, The Struggle for Iraq: World Reaction; Revulsion at 
Prison Abuse Provokes Scorn for the U.S., N.Y. Times, May 5, 2004, at A1. 
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violated an international norm, if that norm is not definitively accepted in all civilized 
nations around the world. 
b. Political Considerations and the Separation of Powers 
 The second consideration is that when making a determination, a court must take 
into account the practical consequences of action permitting that cause of action to be 
heard in a U.S. court.75 This relates directly back to the concern of the Sosa Court of 
allowing the judicial branch to intervene in foreign affairs.  Once a case is heard in court, 
the case must be decided on the merits according to established law.  However, the 
Legislative Branch and Executive Branch consider other factors of national concern, such 
as foreign policy repercussions and U.S. interests abroad, that a judge is not allowed to 
concern himself with when deciding a case.  This could pave the way for dangerous 
precedent to be set by allowing U.S. norms to be held to standards that may conflict with 
national policy interests or restricting the powers of sovereign foreign regimes against 
their citizens, both problems which could create even greater conflict than previously 
existed. 
Quite often, the courts must refrain from adjudicating a case on the merits due to 
the political ramifications or harmful effects on foreign policy that may result.76 This is 
known as the political question doctrine.77 
75 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. 
76 Id.
77 The political question doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison when the Supreme Court declared, “By 
the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in 
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his 
political character, and to his own conscience. . . . The subjects are political. . . . Being entrusted to the 
executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . . Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” Vietnam 
Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Company, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 65 (quoting 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)). 
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A well-recognized, if not altogether clear, justiciability doctrine instructs 
federal courts to avoid deciding ‘political questions.’ It reflects an 
assumption based on our separation of powers doctrine that there is a 
narrow class of claims best resolved by the branches of government 
directly responsible to the people through the vote. Federal courts, when 
faced with certain allegations of unconstitutional government conduct, are 
to dismiss such claims without ruling on the merits.78 
While it is normally left to a party to assert, a court can decide not to hear a case because 
the judgment would encroach into the realm of politics.  If the courts were to get involved 
in such cases, they could be in great danger of destroying some of the separation of 
powers worked into the Constitution, as well as putting many sensitive foreign policy 
issues in jeopardy. 
 Court decisions could claim a limit of foreign governments over their own 
citizens, which would be beyond the mandate of our courts and create external problems 
for the U.S. government.79 “Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for 
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign 
policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great caution.”80 The 
federal courts have received no positive mandate from Congress to define what new 
accepted norms of international law exist.  Without such authority, the courts lack the 
legal power to adopt new norms of international law. 
 One example, noted in the Sosa opinion, is in regard to a number of class action 
lawsuits that are now pending in district court which seek damages from various 
corporations that allegedly participated and/or aided the former Apartheid regime of 
 
78 Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Company, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 64-65 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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South Africa.81 The South African Government objects to these cases being heard 
because they may potentially interfere with the policy adopted by its Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which “deliberately avoided a ‘victors’ justice’ approach to 
the crimes of apartheid and chose instead one based on confession and absolution, 
informed by the principles of reconciliation, reconstruction, reparation and goodwill.”82 
If these cases are allowed to enter federal court and the plaintiffs are awarded damages, it 
could destroy the policy decided on by South Africa, and which is supported by the U.S. 
State Department.83 If this were to happen, the credibility of the United States to 
negotiate and enforce peace treaties around the world would be weakened because the 
terms agreed upon could be undermined by a U.S. court. 
6. Acceptable Sources to Determine if Standard is Met 
In determining if a particular case reaches the Sosa standards sufficiently so that it 
can enter court under the ATCA, the Court set guidelines as to what sources a court may 
use in the absence of treaty or legislation: 
Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they 
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.84 
This standard is remarkably different then the Filartiga standard for sources of law, 
which allowed the court to take into account what scholars and jurists believed accepted 
 
81 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765. 
82 Id. (quoting Declaration of Penuell Mpapa Maduna, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
Republic of South Africa). 
83 See Letter of William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, to Shannen W. Coffin, Deputy Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Oct. 27, 2003. 
84 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766-67 (quoting, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S., at 700). 
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law ought to be (possibly based on acceptance by a single or few nations).85 The Sosa 
standard allows no room for expert input into what the law should be when a district 
court is making its determination, but simply for an expert to state what actually is 
accepted around the world.  If a certain idea does not fit this criterion regarding universal 
acceptance, then it cannot be considered by the court when deciding whether to allow an 
action into court.86 The Supreme Court does not want judges relying on scholarly 
opinions of what the law should be because that could lead to using norms that are not 
established in many nations, which is exactly the type of result that they want to avoid.87 
Instead scholarly works can be referenced, not for their personal opinions as to what 
should be, but for a guide as to what the established law around the world actually is.88 
B. Federal Tort Claims Act 
1. Background and History 
 Just as it narrowed the opening for suits under the ATCA, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sosa also restricted actions against the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act89 (“FTCA”) that occur outside its borders.  “As a sovereign power, the United States 
may be sued only to the extent that it has expressly consented by statute to suit.”90 
Therefore, in order to give private individuals some sort of recourse against the 
government in the event they have been harmed, the Federal Tort Claims Act was 
passed.91 The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the 
United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the 
 
85 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
86 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766-67. 
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. 
90 35A Am Jur 2d, Federal Tort Claims Act §§ 1-3 (quoting Maruska v. U.S., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (D. 
Minn. 1999)). 
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (2005). 
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[Federal] Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like 
circumstances.”92 Under the FTCA, the U.S. can be held liable for torts inflicted upon 
private persons if the plaintiff can show that if the defendant were a private person he 
would liable to the plaintiff under the circumstances.93 
However, with the passage of the FTCA, the U.S. still intended to maintain some 
of its sovereign immunity against certain types of suits.  “In granting its consent to be 
sued, the United States may attach such conditions, and limitations, as it deems proper, 
and strict compliance with those conditions is an absolute requirement.”94 One of these 
conditions attached to the FTCA is the foreign country exception, which stipulates that 
the FTCA shall not apply to “any claim arising in a foreign country.”95 
The reason for the foreign country exception to the FTCA is to avoid the 
possibility of the U.S. government being sued under foreign substantive law in U.S. 
courts.96 The ordinary rule in American courts for suits involving tortious acts would be 
to apply the law from wherever the tort occurred.97 This means that if a tort occurs in a 
foreign country, the American court would have to apply foreign law.  By passing the 
FTCA and allowing the waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress did not want to also 
permit the U.S. government to be subject to foreign law in its own courts, and thus passed 
the foreign country exception in order to avoid that possibility from coming to fruition.98 
92 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting, Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962)). 
93 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2005).  See also, 35A Am Jur 2d, Federal Tort Claims Act §§ 1-3 (quoting Appley 
Bros. v. U.S., 924 F. Supp. 944 (D.S.D. 1996)). 
94 35A Am Jur 2d, Federal Tort Claims Act §§ 1-3 (quoting Stubbs v. U. S., 620 F.2d 775 (10d Cir. 1980)). 
95 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2005). 
96 See U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949).  The reason for the exception is Congressional 
“unwillingness to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.” 
97 Id.
98 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751. 
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Congress was so adamant about the rejection of foreign substantive law being used 
against the government in U.S. courts,99 that it amended the original foreign country 
exception from “arising in a foreign country in behalf of an alien,” to its current form so 
that not even a U.S. citizen would have the opportunity to sue the U.S. under foreign 
substantive law on U.S. soil.100 The final version codifies Congress’s “unwilling[ness] to 
subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.”101 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Sosa102 
As one of the alleged claims in the Sosa suit, Alvarez sued the U.S. government 
directly under the FTCA.  The foreign country exception would seemingly have banned 
this suit because the abduction occurred in Mexico and therefore the claim arose in a 
foreign country.  However, the “headquarters doctrine,” a common law creation that is 
something of an exception to the foreign country exception, seemed to give Alvarez an 
opening.  It allowed claims to be filed under the FTCA if an act had an operative effect in 
a foreign country, so long as the act was committed in the U.S.103 Alvarez claimed, and 
the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the headquarters doctrine applied because the act of 
 
99 In an explanation regarding the amendment of the FTCA to the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Assistant Attorney General Shea said that, “[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted 
from this bill, H. R. 6463, whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined by 
the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims arising in this 
country. This seems desirable because the law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will 
lead I think to a good deal of difficulty.” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751-2 (quoting Hearings on H. R. 5373 et 
al. before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1942)). 
100 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751 (quoting H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., § 303(12)). 
101 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221). 
102 Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 331 F.3d 604 (9d Cir. 2003). 
103 See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2748 (quoting Sami v. U.S, 617 F.2d 755, 761-2 (1979) The rationale for the 
headquarters doctrine was that“ ‘[t]he entire scheme of the FTCA focuses on the place where the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of the government employee occurred,’ [some courts] have 
concluded that the foreign country exception does not exempt the United States from suit ‘for acts or 
omissions occurring here which have their operative effect in another country.’ ” 
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planning the kidnapping by the U.S. government occurred inside the U.S., and then had 
an operative effect in Mexico.104 
In its ruling for Alvarez-Machain v. U.S.,105 the Ninth Circuit accepted Alvarez’s 
theory of the case under the headquarters doctrine.106 The Court reasoned that Alvarez’s 
arrest and detention, within the borders of the United States, was perfectly legal.107 
However, the Court found that the DEA had no authority by which to execute an 
extraterritorial arrest.108 Therefore, all actions committed by the U.S. upon Alvarez while 
still in Mexico were illegal.109 Since the illegal arrest of Alvarez in Mexico resulted from 
planning by DEA agents while inside the United States, the Ninth Circuit believed that, 
“Alvarez’s abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove.”110 As a result, the 
Court refused to exempt the U.S. from liability under the foreign country exception 
because of the headquarters doctrine.111 
3. Elimination of the Headquarters Doctrine by Sosa 
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court came 
up with a different outcome.  The Supreme Court did not like the application of the 
headquarters doctrine in this case, and others like it, because of its potential limitless 
 
104 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2748-49. 
105 Alvarez-Machain v. U.S., 331 F.3d 604 (9d Cir. 2003). 
106 Id. at 640-41. 
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 638. 
111 “Working out of DEA offices in Los Angeles, [DEA agents] made the decision to kidnap Alvarez and . . 
. gave [their Mexican intermediary] precise instructions on whom to recruit, how to seize Alvarez, and 
how he should be treated during the trip to the United States. DEA officials in Washington, D. C., 
approved the details of the operation. After Alvarez was abducted according to plan, DEA agents 
supervised his transportation into the United States, telling the arrest team where to land the plane and 
obtaining clearance in El Paso for landing. The United States, and California in particular, served as 
command central for the operation carried out in Mexico.”  Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 638-639. 
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effect.112 The Court believed that the headquarters doctrine “threatens to swallow the 
foreign country exception whole.”113 “[I]t will virtually always be possible to assert that 
the negligent activity that injured the plaintiff [abroad] was the consequence of faulty 
training, selection or supervision--or even less than that, lack of careful training, selection 
or supervision--in the United States.”114 Any case that involved actions that occurred 
abroad, but had relations in some manner to any acts from within the United States could 
be heard under the FTCA, thus, for all practical effect, eliminating the foreign country 
exception that Congress expressly codified in § 2680.115 
In order to avoid any conflicts with Congressional intent when passing the foreign 
country exception to the FTCA, the Supreme Court held “that the FTCA’s foreign 
country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, 
regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred,” thereby eliminating the 
headquarters doctrine and reinforcing the foreign country exception codified under 28 
U.S.C. § 2680.116 The Court decided that the express legislative intent of Congress, as 
codified in the FTCA, cannot be destroyed by judicial interpretation, and therefore the 
headquarters doctrine cannot supersede the foreign country exception.117 
Allowing the headquarters doctrine to be used to overrule the foreign country 
exception could allow for the application of foreign substantive laws in U.S. courts 
against its own government, which was specifically what Congress wanted to avoid by 
 
112 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2749. 
113 Id.
114 Beattie v. U.S., 756 F.2d 91,119 (CADC 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2749. 
116 Id, at 2754. 
117 Id.
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passing the foreign country exception to the FTCA.118 Therefore, with this decision, the 
Supreme Court has protected the Congressional intent of Congress when passing the 
FTCA and eliminated any possibility for a suit against the federal government for actions 
that occur outside the United States. 
III. Problems Emerging Subsequent to Sosa 
A. The Dangers of Banning All Government Liability for Acts on Foreign Soil 
Under the FTCA 
 
While the protection of Congressional intent, by means of the elimination of the 
headquarters doctrine, is always important for a court, it also creates other problems.  
Sosa does allow for limited actions against private individuals, but gives no possibility 
for suits against the U.S. for violations committed outside the country.  If the courts can 
hear cases regarding violations of international law in its own courts under the ATCA, 
allowances should be made for actions against the sovereign as well. 
Although situations where U.S. courts can offer civil relief must be limited in 
order to promote foreign policy and avoid the use of foreign substantive law against the 
U.S. government in its own courts, some possibility of relief should be left open.  While 
torture is a tactic that is commonly thought to be one of the most troublesome violations 
of international law and implemented only by foreign regimes as, as evidenced by the 
atrocities at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, the representatives of the U.S. 
government may also be responsible for clear violations of U.S. and international law.119 
118 The court reasoned that by the words “arising in” from the “arising in a foreign country” exception, 
Congress was referring to the place of harm, and not some related actions that proximately caused the 
harm.  Thus, any harm that occurred outside the United States is not actionable under the FTCA due to 
the foreign country exception.  Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2750 
119 Neil MacFarquhar, The Struggle for Iraq: World Reaction; Revulsion at Prison Abuse Provokes Scorn 
for the U.S., N.Y. Times, May 5, 2004, at A1. 
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If the U.S. is to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people in order to win the war,120 
people who have been wronged must have a way of obtaining redemption for violations 
of international and U.S. law. 
The availability of civil remedy for atrocities connected to war must be very 
limited, but must exist nonetheless.  The U.S. is conducting military operations in many 
locations around the world, most notably Iraq and Afghanistan, and cannot be held liable 
for all actions that could be brought to court.  Whether or not you accept collateral 
damage as an unfortunate certainty in modern warfare, it should not be actionable in 
every situation.  To allow people to sue the government or military personnel for all 
wrongful acts would not only completely overburden the courts, but would impair the 
war effort, precisely what the Supreme Court wants to avoid by staying out of foreign 
policy.  However, if George W. Bush (“President Bush”) would like to hold the U.S. up 
to a higher standard in order to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic world, then the 
government’s actions must mimic their words.  If the U.S. is responsible for a clear 
violation of a commonly accepted norm of international law, then the government and the 
individuals responsible should be held liable to the victims of their actions. 
The headquarters doctrine was created by the courts, and has been used as a 
backdoor to the FTCA in order to avoid the foreign country exception.  The U.S. 
Government should not hold itself liable for tortious acts committed domestically, but 
 
120 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 371, 372. See Brian Knowlton, Anger Grows over Iraqi Prisoners, Int'l Herald 
Trib., May 4, 2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/518107.html (quoting Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal 
Kharrazi, “If Americans are in Iraq to promote democracy, is this the way to do it?”); Press Release, 
Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White 
House (Apr. 30, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2004/04/20040430-2.html 
(Responding to the question “How are you going to win [the Iraqi people's] hearts and minds with 
these sort of tactics?,” President Bush stated, "I shared a deep disgust that those prisoners were treated 
the way they were treated. Their treatment does not reflect the nature of the American people."). 
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then simply look the other way if it commits a wrong on foreign soil, even if planning 
and preparation for the act occurred on U.S. soil. 
Alternate solutions and compromises should be looked at instead of an outright 
ban under the foreign country exception.  One possible answer is that a case could be 
allowed into federal court under the FTCA if the plaintiff agrees to accept U.S. 
substantive law, instead of any foreign laws, in order for the case to be adjudicated.  A 
compromise should be made so that victims of tortious acts by the U.S. government do 
not go uncompensated for the wrongful acts committed upon them.  Seeing how the 
courts have already shut the back door exception to the foreign country exception, 
Congress must play the leading role in changing the law. 
B. Problems Under the ATCA 
 While the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard for a case entering 
federal court under the ATCA, recent conflicting decisions have shown that the line is 
still quite blurred.  Cases with very similar facts, such as Joo v. Japan121 and Dow 
Chemical122 have been decided different ways by different courts.  Just as the ATCA 
statute itself is extremely vague, the standard created by the Supreme Court in Sosa is 
abstract and leaves open the possibility for diverging interpretations.  Many judges have 
differed as to what are and are not accepted norms of customary international law and as 
to what cases should be adjudicated on the merits due to potential political ramifications 
and other concerns.123 Ever since the Sosa decision in 2004, there has been a wide 
 
121 Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (DC Cir 2005). 
122 Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Company, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
123 See Joo, 413 F.3d 45 and Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7. 
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variety of conflicting case law regarding which ATCA cases can be heard under the Sosa 
guidelines. 
1. Cases with Potential Political and Foreign Policy Consequences 
In Joo v. Japan,124 the court followed the guidance from Sosa and decided that it 
is important for the courts not to disturb the functions of the other branches of the 
government.125 Just as the courts must respect and positively enforce treaties created by 
the executive and ratified by Congress, they must also negatively enforce any policy 
decisions by the other branches of the government to not allow lawsuits based on certain 
conflicts.126 The courts must not impinge on the policies of the other branches of the 
federal government or they could substantially impair U.S. foreign policy around the 
world.127 All ends of the spectrum could be hurt from the military strategists, to 
intelligence agents, to peace negotiators.128 If peace negotiators prefer to create a peace 
without reparations, then that must be enforced on the private level as well in the courts 
of the U.S.129 If not the treaty would be useless to a surrendering nation, and the U.S. 
 
124 Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (DC Cir 2005). 
125 Id. at 49. 
126 Id. at 52-53. 
127 Id. at 51-52. 
128 Id. at 52-53. 
129 “The Supreme Court first expressed the same understanding with respect to the Treaty of Paris ending 
the War of Independence, which expressly provided for the preservation of private claims. In Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230, 1 L. Ed. 568, 3 Dall. 199 (1796), a case brought by a British subject to 
recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote:  
‘I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, 
neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or 
brought into contest again. All [violence], injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of 
either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; 
and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, 
British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be 
provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the 
treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in 
courts of justice.’ ” Joo, 413 F.3d at 51. 
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will lose its credibility to negotiate peace treaties because its own courts violate the 
terms. 
That is why in Joo, the D.C. Circuit would not hear a case brought by women 
from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines against Japan for the routine rape, 
torture, and murder that occurred prior to World War II.130 Article 14 of the 1951 peace 
treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers expressly waived all claims of the Allied 
Powers and their nationals to sue Japan for actions that occurred during the execution of 
the war.131 The Plaintiffs claim that they should still be allowed to sue because they are 
nationals of countries that were not a part of the 1951 treaty.  However, the Court 
believed that “it [was] pellucidly clear the Allied Powers intended that all war-related 
claims against Japan be resolved through government-to-government negotiations rather 
than through private tort suits . . . the 1951 Treaty at a minimum obliges the courts of the 
United States not to disregard those bilateral resolutions.”132 Despite the fact that the 
Plaintiffs may have a valid point, the Court still opted to dismiss the action because it 
would interfere with State Department foreign policy decisions,133 which has been to 
dismiss private claims that could interfere with the peace since the end of World War 
II.134 
130 Id. at 46. 
131 3 U.S.T. 3169. 
132 Joo, 413 F.3d at 50. 
133 “[T[he Executive has persuasively demonstrated that adjudication by a domestic court not only ‘would 
undo’ a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan's 
‘delicate’ relations with China and Korea, thereby creating ‘serious implications for stability in the 
region.’ Joo, 413 F.3d at 52 (quoting Statement of Interest at 34-35). 
134 “[G]overnments have dealt with ... private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as 
counters, 'chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims 
deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard 
to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political 
considerations unrelated to debts.” Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 300 (2d edition 
1996).  See Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981) 
(upholding President's authority to settle claims of citizens as "a necessary incident to the resolution of a 
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However, while some courts reasoned that Sosa requires that they stay completely 
out of the foreign policy arena, others found (in remarkably similar cases) that Sosa still 
allows them to hear some cases even though they may have political tie-ins.  In Dow 
Chemical,135 the Plaintiffs sued a corporation for harm done to them by Agent Orange, a 
herbicide used by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Military in Vietnam.  While this would 
seem to be a matter of foreign policy and reparations and thus result in a dismissal like 
Joo, the Dow Chemical court instead decided to hear this case on the merits because it 
would not violate the Sosa standard.136 The Court rationalized allowing this case by 
analogizing it to a 1962 Supreme Court case in which the Court said: 
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching 
foreign relations are political questions. . . . Yet it is error to suppose that 
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a 
discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the 
history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to 
judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, 
and of the possible consequences of judicial action.137 
Even with the new precedent from Sosa regarding cases under the ATCA, the 
Dow Chemical court refused to rule this case as nonjusticiable due to foreign relation 
issues.  While it seems as though both the Dow Chemical and Joo cases hold similar fact 
patterns and potential political consequences of disturbing a peace, the two courts 
managed to interpret Sosa in such different manners as to give conflicting decisions in 
extremely similar circumstances.  Applying the abstract standards from Sosa, it is 
 
major foreign policy dispute between our country and another [at least] where ... Congress acquiesced in 
the President's action"). Joo, 413 F.3d at 51-52.  
135 Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Company, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
136 Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
137 Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962)). 
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difficult to claim that either court was seriously in error because the standards adopted by 
the Supreme Court allow for either a broad or narrow interpretation by lower courts.  
2. Cases Involving Corporations Assistance to Atrocities 
In addition to identifying the separation of powers concerns for the courts that 
have resulted in varied holdings by different judges, the Sosa decision can be used as a 
window for U.S. corporations to willfully aid and abet egregious human rights violations 
around the world to increase their bottom line.  A judge applied a strict interpretation of 
the Sosa decision and found that accomplice liability is not a customary norm of 
international law that is fully accepted around the world.  “In a recent submission to the 
Ninth Circuit, the executive branch argued that aiding and abetting liability is not so 
clearly established as to support ATCA jurisdiction after Sosa.”138 Therefore, a 
corporation that today aided a perpetrator of human rights atrocities abroad, such as the 
torture, rape, or genocide of innocent civilians, may not be liable to any of the victims for 
the wrongs committed upon them because the corporation was merely “assisting” the 
atrocities without physically committing them.139 
One problem with the stance of the Administration of George W. Bush (“Bush 
Administration”) is that, 
[a]t the time the ATCA was enacted, the federal courts clearly recognized 
accomplice liability for violations of international law140 . . . Several of the 
classic eighteenth-century cases applying international law in criminal 
prosecutions invoked accessory liability.  In Talbot v. Janson141 for 
 
138 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 533, 558. See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae at 7-8, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628), available 
at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/dojunocalbrief.pdf.
139 Owen C. Pell, Tort Claims Under International Law, 231 New York Law Journal 4 (col. 4), August 8, 
2004, at 4. 
140 So did William Blackstone, the main source relied upon by the Supreme Court in its analysis of the 
original intent of the ATCA. In his discussion of piracy, Blackstone recognized broad liability for those 
aiding pirates in any manner. 
141 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). 
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example, the Court found the defendant liable for aiding in the unlawful 
capture of a neutral ship.142 Similarly, Henfield's Case143 recognized 
liability for “committing, aiding or abetting hostilities” in violation of the 
law of nations.144 
Therefore, because these were issues that were “defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized,145 they fit under the 
scheme of acceptable actions created in Sosa.
However, in their submission to the Ninth Circuit for the Doe I case146, the Bush 
Administration argued that it is interference with foreign policy and business investment, 
rather than legal impediments, which should prohibit corporations from being sued for 
aiding and abetting in human rights violations abroad.147 Even if some deference must be 
given to defense contractors and other corporations to forward U.S. interests abroad, this 
policy cannot be taken too far.  If the administration’s argument were to be taken at its 
word, this would be a virtual free pass for corporations to increase their profit margins by 
way of supporting atrocities, so long as they were only aiding the direct violators 
themselves, and not actually committing any atrocities.  By this rationale, German 
corporations who built the ovens and gas chambers during the Holocaust would be free to 
continue such projects for profit even today, without the possibility of incurring liability.  
They would be committing no wrong that could be actionable in the eyes of American 
courts because they were simply aiding and abetting an atrocity, and had no direct 
connection to genocide. 
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One extreme example of outrageous abuses committed indirectly by a U.S. 
corporation which the court refused to hear due to the Sosa doctrine came in Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp.148 The Plaintiffs alleged that the Exxon Mobil Corporation 
contracted with the Indonesian National Army to provide security for the construction of 
a pipeline through Indonesia.149 The defendants allegedly provided financial, logistical, 
and strategical support for the security effort.150 The Plaintiffs alleged that the soldiers 
hired to provide security engaged in human rights violations that include torture, rape, 
and genocide.151 They brought suit against Exxon Mobil as accomplices to the atrocities. 
Despite these alleged atrocities occurring in Indonesia, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia refrained from hearing the case.152 The State Department filed a 
statement of interest in which it stated that it “believes that adjudication of this lawsuit at 
this time would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of 
the United States, including interests related directly to the on-going struggle against 
international terrorism.”153 This stance was taken partly due to the Indonesian 
government’s statement that it “cannot accept the extra territorial jurisdiction of a United 
States court over an allegation against an Indonesian government institution.”154 In 
response the Court reasoned that “[l]iability for ‘aiding and abetting’ violations of 
international law is not itself actionable under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.S. 
§ 1350,”155 and that “[p]laintiffs cannot maintain a claim for ‘sexual violence’ under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350, because it is not sufficiently recognized under 
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international law.”156 As a result the court decided that it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case under the ATCA.157 
This case does bring about a conflict of interest for the court.  Indonesia is a major 
partner in the global effort to prevent terrorism after 9/11, and to adjudicate this case 
could cause serious relation setbacks with their government.158 However, a major 
American corporation such as Exxon Mobil should not be free to roam the world, aiding 
in atrocities at will in pursuit of profit, and remain free from consequence so long as they 
do not directly commit any acts, simply because it may interfere with a foreign policy 
interest. 
The Court’s decision reflects the most troublesome aspect of the Sosa decision 
because it opens the door to abuses by U.S. corporations that the courts refuse to address.  
If the aiding of a perpetrator of sexual violence and genocide cannot be maintained as a 
violation of customary international law around the world, then there is very little that 
can.  Freedom from rape, torture, and murder are quite possibly the three most important 
freedoms any individual can possess, yet at least one American court does not consider 
support of these horrific acts as actionable under the ATCA.  This is a clear indicator of 
the potentially wide scope of interpretation left open by Sosa to the judiciary, as well as a 
need by Congress to step in and create some boundaries to prevent abuses.  Otherwise 
companies such as Exxon Mobil, that fly the American flag over its headquarters, can 
continue to make large profits by aiding some of the most horrid and atrocious human 
rights violations around the world without the possibility of incurring any liability. 
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Another predicament is that the Sosa doctrine is open to such wide interpretation 
that the courts have contrary opinions on what should be allowed into court and what 
should not.  While some courts refuse to allow any cases involving corporate accessory 
liability under the ATCA (as in Doe), others are showing reluctance to give corporations 
the leeway to assist in the commission of human rights violations without liability, and 
are still allowing such actions into court.  In Dow Chemical, the aforementioned case of 
Vietnamese victims of the use of Agent Orange War in Vietnam,159 the Defendant 
Corporation attempted to claim that they committed no direct act against the Plaintiffs 
and therefore did not violate any customary international norm pursuant to the Sosa 
standard.  However, the Court disagreed with Dow Chemical and held that: 
[C]ustomary international law, which prohibits inhumane acts of a very 
serious nature such as willful killing and torture and other inhumane acts 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. 
Leaders, organizers, facilitators, conspirators and accomplices 
participating in the formulation and execution of these acts are responsible 
for all acts performed by any person in execution of this plan.160 
This explains that a corporation which is merely an accessory to an atrocity may still be 
held liable for acts of which they aid the commission. 
The finding by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 
Dow Chemical is in direct opposition to the District Court’s finding in Doe. Even with 
their contrary interpretations, the reasoning of both courts can be justified under Sosa.
That is why Congress needs to step in and create definitive boundaries in this area, 
specifying what can and cannot be adjudicated under the ATCA.  Otherwise differing 
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stances in different jurisdictions may lead to potential plaintiffs’ cherry picking their 
venue, as well as further inconsistent decisions in similar matters. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Sosa decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has taken the 
enforcement of the ATCA and FTCA in a new direction.  While the intent of the Court 
was to clarify when and how the ATCA and FTCA can be implemented in order to avoid 
abuses of the separation of powers and to uphold Congressional intent, it has failed to 
solve the problem.  The particular customary norms of international law that can be 
enforced under the ATCA are still unclear.  This is currently resulting in divergent 
judicial decisions in similar cases.  Also, Congress’s intent when passing the FTCA was 
to hold the Federal government liable for tortious wrongs it commits, but with the 
elimination of the headquarters doctrine, the FTCA will fail to reimburse private people 
and companies for wrongs the government has committed outside of the country. 
The Supreme Court tried its best to set standards in the Sosa decision, but they 
can only go so far.  It is the job of the legislature to create new and better laws to correct 
the injustices that are continuing to occur.  Congress must take the next step to fix the 
problems and create clarity with these laws.  Only when specific and fair standards are set 
by Congress that can allow judges to fairly and correctly decide future cases will past 
injustices be avoided from reoccurring and future human rights violations be halted 
instead of turning a blind eye. 
